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Abstract
We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influ-
ence on the learning algorithm’s predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a
sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold. First, we want the learning algorithm to be no-
regret with respect to the best fixed expert in hindsight. Second, we want incentive compatibility,
a guarantee that each expert’s best strategy is to report his true beliefs about the realization
of each event. To achieve this goal, we build on the literature on wagering mechanisms, a type
of multi-agent scoring rule. We provide algorithms that achieve no regret and incentive com-
patibility for myopic experts for both the full and partial information settings. In experiments
on datasets from FiveThirtyEight, our algorithms have regret comparable to classic no-regret
algorithms, which are not incentive-compatible. Finally, we identify an incentive-compatible
algorithm for forward-looking strategic agents that exhibits diminishing regret in practice.
1 Introduction
We study an online learning setting in which a learner makes predictions about a sequence of T
binary events [23, 15, 6, 8, 22, 4]. The learner has access to a pool of K experts, each with beliefs
about the likelihood of each event occurring. The standard goal of the learner is to output a
sequence of predictions almost as accurate as those of the best fixed expert in hindsight. Such a
learner is said to have no regret.
But what if the experts that the learner consults are strategic agents, capable of reporting
predictions that do not represent their true beliefs? As pointed out by Roughgarden and Schrijvers
[19], when the learner is not only making predictions but also (implicitly or explicitly) evaluating
the experts, experts might have incentive to misreport. The Good Judgment Project,1 a competitor
in IARPA’s Aggregative Contingent Estimation geopolitical forecasting contest, scored individual
forecasters and rewarded the top 2%—dubbed “Superforecasters” [21]—with perks such as paid
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conference travel; some are now employed by a spinoff company. Similarly, the website FiveThir-
tyEight2 not only predicts election results by aggregating different pollsters, but also publicly scores
the pollsters, in a way that correlates with the amount of influence that the pollsters have over the
FiveThirtyEight aggregate. It is natural to expect that forecasters might respond to the compet-
itive incentive structure in these settings by seeking to maximize the influence that they exert on
the learner’s prediction.
When an online learning algorithm is designed in such a way that experts are motivated to
report their true beliefs, we say it is incentive-compatible. Incentive compatibility is desirable for
several reasons. First, when experts do not report truthfully, the learner’s prediction may be
harmed. Second, learning algorithms that fail incentive compatibility place an additional layer
of cognitive burden on the experts, who must now reason about the details of the algorithm and
other experts’ reports and beliefs in order to decide how to act optimally. To our knowledge,
the standard multiplicative-weights-type algorithms fail incentive compatibility, in the sense that
experts can sometimes achieve a greater influence on the algorithm’s prediction by misreporting
their beliefs; we illustrate this explicitly through manipulation examples. Our goal in this work is
to design incentive-compatible online learning algorithms without compromising on the quality of
the algorithm’s predictions. That is, we seek algorithms that are both incentive-compatible and
no-regret, for both the full and partial (bandit) information settings.
Towards this goal, we show a novel connection between online learning and wagering mecha-
nisms [13, 14], a type of multi-agent scoring rule that allows a principal to elicit the beliefs of a
group of agents without taking on financial risk. Using this connection, we construct online learn-
ing algorithms that are incentive-compatible and incur sublinear regret. For the full information
setting, we introduce Weighted-Score Update (WSU), which yields regret O(
√
T lnK), matching the
optimal regret achievable for general loss functions, even without incentive guarantees. For the par-
tial information setting, we introduce Weighted-Score Update with Uniform Exploration (WSU-UX),
which achieves regret O(T 2/3(K lnK)1/3).
We focus primarily on experts that strategize only about their influence at the next timestep.
However, we obtain a partial extension for forward-looking experts. Building on a mechanism
that was proposed for forecasting competitions [24], we identify an algorithm, ELF-X, for the full
information setting that is incentive-compatible and achieves diminishing regret in simulations.
Our theoretical results are supported by experiments on data gathered from an online prediction
contest on FiveThirtyEight. Our algorithms achieve regret almost identical to the classic (and not
incentive-compatible) Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) [8] and EXP3 [4] algorithms in the full
and partial information settings respectively, though WSU falls short of the optimal regret achieved
by Hedge for quadratic loss.
Related Work. Other work has drawn connections between online learning and incentive-compatible
forecasting, particularly in the context of prediction markets [2, 1, 9, 11]. Our work is most closely
related to that of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [19], but differs from theirs in several important
ways. Most crucially, Roughgarden and Schrijvers consider algorithms that maintain unnormalized
weights over the experts, and they assume that an expert’s incentives are only affected by these
weights. In our work, incentives are tied to the expert’s normalized weight—that is, his probabil-
ity of being selected by the learning algorithm. We argue that normalized weights better reflect
experts’ incentives in reality, since reputation tends to be relative more than absolute; put another
2https://fivethirtyeight.com/
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way, doubling the unnormalized weight of every expert should not increase an expert’s utility, since
his influence over the learner’s prediction remains the same. Under Roughgarden and Schrijvers’
model, the design problem is fairly simple when the loss function is a proper loss [18]—that is,
one that can be elicited by a proper scoring rule [20, 10], such as the quadratic loss function—and
can be solved with a multiplicative weights algorithm. Because of this, they focus primarily on the
absolute loss function, which is not a proper loss. In contrast, in our model, the design problem is
nontrivial even for these “easier” proper loss functions.
Conceptually, our work builds on work by Witkowski et al. [24], who use competitive scoring
rules—a subclass of wagering mechanisms—to design incentive-compatible forecasting competi-
tions. We discuss their work further in Section 5. Our work also has connections with the work
of Orabona and Pa´l [17], who introduce a class of coin-betting algorithms for online learning. Al-
though Orabona and Pa´l [17] do not address incentives and do not make a connection with the
wagering mechanisms literature, our WSU algorithm can be interpreted as a coin-betting algorithm.3
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a setting in which a learner interacts with a set of K experts, each making probabilistic
predictions about a sequence of T binary outcomes.4 At each round t ∈ [T ], each expert i ∈
[K] has a private belief bi,t ∈ [0, 1], unknown to the learner, about the outcome for that round.
Both the experts’ beliefs and the sequence of outcomes may be chosen arbitrarily, and potentially
adversarially.
In the full information setting, each expert reports his prediction pi,t ∈ [0, 1] to the learner. The
learner then chooses her own prediction p¯t ∈ [0, 1] and observes the outcome realization rt ∈ {0, 1}.
Finally, the learner and the experts incur losses `t = `(p¯t, rt) and `i,t = `(pi,t, rt), ∀i ∈ [K], where
` : [0, 1]×{0, 1} → [0, 1] is a bounded loss function.5 As is common in the literature, we restrict our
attention to algorithms in which the learner maintains a timestep-specific probability distribution
pit = (pi1,t, . . . , piK,t) over the experts, and chooses her prediction p¯t according to this distribution.
Unless specified, this means that the learner predicts p¯t = pi,t with probability pii,t; some of our
results additionally apply when p¯t =
∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t.
Under partial information, the protocol remains the same except that the learner is explicitly
restricted to choosing a single expert It on each round t (according to distribution pit) and does
not observe the predictions of other experts.
The goal of the learner is twofold. First, she wishes to incur a total loss that is not too much
worse than the loss of the best fixed expert in hindsight. This is captured using the classic notion
of regret, given by
R = E
∑
t∈[T ]
`t − min
i∈[K]
∑
t∈[T ]
`i,t
 ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to randomness in the learner’s choice of p¯t.
3In the language of coin betting, in WSU experts wager an η fraction of their wealth on the positive realization of
the event, and the actual outcome of each coin flip is the expert’s loss minus the weighted average loss of all other
experts.
4We focus on binary outcomes to simplify the presentation of our results, but our techniques could be applied
more broadly.
5The loss function taking values in [0, 1] is without loss of generality since any bounded loss function could be
scaled.
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No-regret algorithms have been proposed in both the full and partial information settings.
Many, such as Hedge [8] and MWU [3], achieve regret of O(
√
T lnK) for general loss functions by
maintaining unnormalized weights wi,t for each expert i that are updated multiplicatively at each
timestep. Hedge uses the update rule wi,t+1 = wi,t exp(−η`i,t), while MWU uses wi,t+1 = wi,t(1−η`i,t)
for appropriately chosen values of η. These weights are then normalized to arrive at the distribution
pit. For the case of exp-concave loss functions, such as the quadratic loss, Kivinen and Warmuth
[12] showed that by aggregating experts’ predictions and tuning η appropriately, Hedge can achieve
regret O(lnK).
For the partial information setting, the EXP3 algorithm of Auer et al. [4] achieves a regret of
O(
√
TK lnK). EXP3 maintains a set of expert weights similar to those of Hedge. However, since
the learner can only observe the prediction of the chosen expert, she uses an unbiased estimator
ˆ`
i,t of each expert i’s loss in her updates in place of `i,t. The update rule then becomes wi,t+1 =
wi,t exp(−η ˆ`i,t).
The second goal of the learner is to incentivize experts to truthfully report their private beliefs.
In our model, at each timestep t, each expert i chooses his report pi,t strategically to maximize
the probability pii,t+1 that he is chosen at timestep t + 1. An algorithm is incentive-compatible if
experts maximize this probability by reporting pi,t = bi,t, irrespective of the reports of the other
experts.
Definition 2.1 (Incentive Compatibility). An online learning algorithm is incentive-compatible if
for every timestep t ∈ [T ], every expert i with belief bi,t, every report pi,t, every vector of reports of
the other experts p−i,t, and every history of reports (pt′)t′<t and outcomes (rt′)t′<t,
E
rt∼Bern(bi,t)
[pii,t+1| (bi,t,p−i,t) , rt, (rt′)t′<t, (pt′)t′<t]
≥ E
rt∼Bern(bi,t)
[pii,t+1| (pi,t,p−i,t) , rt, (rt′)t′<t, (pt′)t′<t] .
where by r ∼ Bern(b) we denote a random variable r taking value 1 with probability b and 0
otherwise.
Incentive compatibility guarantees that any regret bounds apply not only with respect to the
reports of the experts, but also with respect to their beliefs. This notion of regret is often called
strategic regret, and in general may be higher or lower than standard regret. For an incentive-
compatible algorithm, the two notions coincide.
To achieve incentive compatibility, we restrict attention to proper loss functions [18], referred
to in the forecasting literature as proper scoring rules [16, 20, 10].
Definition 2.2. A loss function ` is said to be proper if
Er∼Bern(b)[`(p, r)] ≥ Er∼Bern(b)[`(b, r)], ∀p 6= b.
Restricting attention to proper loss functions, we are guaranteed that an expert who cares
only about his expected loss would truthfully report his beliefs. However, this does not apply for
experts who care about their probability of being chosen by the learner, as in our setting. Indeed,
known online learning algorithms fail to be incentive-compatible even for proper loss functions. We
illustrate this in the following example for MWU with the (proper) quadratic loss function `(p, r) =
(p − r)2. Here the normalization of weights by the factor ∑j∈[K]wj,t, which depends on both pi,t
and rt, can create incentives for agent i to deviate. We note that a similar counterexample can be
proved for Gradient Descent too, and we include it in Appendix A.
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Example 2.1. Let `(p, r) = (p−r)2. Under standard initialization for MWU, wi,1 = 1 for all i ∈ [K].
Suppose that b1,1 = 0.5 and pi,1 = 0 for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,K}. Then E[pi1,2], the expected probability
that expert 1 is chosen at time 2 under MWU with respect to his own beliefs, is
0.5
(
1− η(1− p1,1)2
K − η(1− p1,1)2 − η(K−1)
)
+ 0.5
(
1−ηp21,1
K−ηp21,1
)
.
For K ≥ 3 and T ≥ 9 ln(3), the denominator in the first term is less than the denominator in the
second term, independent of p1,1. The derivative of E[pi1,2] with respect to p1,1 is therefore strictly
positive at 0.5, implying that expert 1 maximizes his utility by reporting some p1,1 > 0.5.
Thus, unlike in the setting of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [19], using a proper loss function
with a standard algorithm is not enough, and new algorithmic ideas are needed. To derive our
algorithms, we draw a connection between online learning and wagering mechanisms, one-shot
elicitation mechanisms that allow experts to bet on the quality of their predictions relative to
others. In the one-shot wagering setting introduced by Lambert et al. [13], each agent i ∈ [K] holds
a belief bi ∈ [0, 1] about the likelihood of an event. Agent i reports a probability pi and a wager
wi ≥ 0. A wagering mechanism, Γ, maps the reports p = (p1, . . . , pK), wagers w = (w1, . . . , wK),
and the realization r of the binary event to payments Γi(p,w, r) for each agent i. The purpose of
the wager is to allow each agent to set a maximum allowable loss, which is captured by imposing
the constraint that Γi(p,w, r) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [K]. We restrict our attention to budget-balanced wagering
mechanisms for which
∑
i∈[K] Γi(p,w, r) =
∑
i∈[K]wi.
A wagering mechanism Γ is said to be incentive-compatible if for every agent i ∈ [K] with belief
bi ∈ [0, 1], every report pi ∈ [0, 1], every vector of reports of the other agents p−i, and every vector
of wagers w, Er∼Bern(bi) [Γi ((bi,p−i) ,w, r)] ≥ Er∼Bern(bi) [Γi ((pi,p−i) ,w, r)].
One class of budget-balanced, incentive-compatible wagering mechanisms is the Weighted Score
Wagering Mechanisms (WSWMs) of Lambert et al. [13, 14]. Fixing any proper loss function ` bounded
in [0, 1], agent i receives
ΓWSWMi (p,w, r) = wi
1−`(pi, r)+ ∑
j∈[K]
wj`(pj , r)
 .
WSWMs are incentive-compatible because the payment an agent receives is a linear function of his loss,
measured by a proper loss function. An agent makes a profit (i.e., receives payment greater than
his wager), whenever his loss is smaller than the wager-weighted average agent loss, so accurate
agents are more likely to increase their wealth.
3 The Full Information Setting
In this section, we present and analyze an online prediction algorithm, Weighted-Score Update
(WSU), for the full information setting. We show that WSU is incentive-compatible and achieves
regret O(
√
T lnK).
Our key observation is that we can define a black-box reduction that transforms any budget-
balanced wagering mechanism Γ to an online learning algorithm by setting pit+1 = Γ(pt,pit, rt).
Here we can interpret an expert’s weight according to distribution pit as their currency. Each expert
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“wagers” pit at time t and receives a payoff pit+1, which depends on the reports of the experts p
and the realization rt. It is easy to see that any online prediction algorithm that is derived from
an incentive-compatible wagering mechanism will in turn be incentive-compatible, because any
misreport that increases weight pit+1 would also be a successful misreport in the wagering setting.
One might hope that applying this reduction to the WSWM would directly yield a no-regret online
learning algorithm. But this is not the case, due to the fact that an expert who makes an inaccurate
prediction can lose too much of his wealth (probability) if all other experts have low loss, and it
can take a long time to recover from this. To handle this, we allow experts to “wager” only an
η fraction of their current probability at each timestep for some η ∈ (0, 0.5]. This guarantees
that no expert can obtain a probability pii,t close to zero without having made a long series of
inaccurate predictions. Formally, the update rule of our algorithm, the Weighted-Score Update
(WSU), is defined by:
pii,t+1 = ηΓ
WSWM
i (pt,pit, rt) + (1− η)pii,t, (1)
with weights pii,1 initialized to pii,1 = 1/K for all i.
We must show that pit is a valid probability distribution over experts at each t. This follows
from the WSWM being budget-balanced; the proof is in the appendix (Lemma B.1).
By rewriting the WSU update rule in terms of relative loss Li,t = `i,t−
∑
j∈[K] pij,t`j,t, we can see
that the form of the update is quite familiar. In particular, from Equation (1),
pii,t+1 = ηpii,t
1−`i,t+ ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t`j,t
+ (1− η)pii,t = pii,t(1− ηLi,t). (2)
This resembles the update rule for the (unnormalized) weights maintained by MWU, but with the
relative loss Li,t in place of `i,t. The D-Prod algorithm of Even-Dar et al. [7] involves a similar
update, but using loss relative to a single fixed distribution over experts instead of pit.
We are now ready to prove our guarantees. The proof of Theorem 3.1 proceeds in a similar
manner to the standard proof that MWU satisfies no regret. However, our proof is slightly simpler
because we do not need to make a distinction between (unnormalized) weights and (normalized)
probabilities. We can therefore avoid introducing the standard potential function used in proofs of
no regret.
Theorem 3.1. WSU is incentive-compatible and for step size η =
√
ln(K)/T yields regret R ≤
2
√
T lnK.
Proof. For incentive compatibility, note that from Equation (1), pii,t+1 is a convex combination of a
WSWM payment and pii,t, which cannot be influenced by i’s report at time t. Since truthful reporting
(at least weakly) maximizes each of these components, it also maximizes the sum.
For the regret, denoting by i∗ the best expert in hindsight,
1 ≥ pii∗,T+1 = pii∗,T (1− ηLi∗,T ) = pii∗,1
∏
t∈[T ]
(1− ηLi∗,t) = 1
K
∏
t∈[T ]
(1− ηLi∗,t) .
Taking the logarithm for both sides of this inequality, we get
0 ≥ − lnK +
∑
t∈[T ]
ln (1− ηLi∗,t) ≥ − lnK +
∑
t∈[T ]
(−ηLi∗,t − η2L2i∗,t) ,
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that for x ≤ 1/2, ln(1−x) ≥ −x−x2 (see Lemma B.2).
Rearranging and dividing both sides by η yields
−
∑
t∈[T ]
Li∗,t ≤ lnK
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
L2i∗,t.
Since we have
∑
t∈[T ] Li∗,t =
∑
t∈[T ] `i∗,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K] pij,t`j,t = −R, this becomes
R ≤ lnK
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
L2i∗,t ≤
lnK
η
+ ηT.
Finally, tuning η =
√
ln(K)/T gives us the result.
If T is not known in advance, a standard doubling trick [4] can be applied with only a constant
factor increase in regret; see Appendix B.3 for details.
The regret and incentive-compatibility guarantees of WSU presented in Theorem 3.1 hold for all
[0, 1]-bounded proper loss functions `. If ` is additionally convex, then these guarantees carry over
to a (possibly more practical) variant of WSU, termed WSU-Aggr, that uses the same update rule but
sets p¯t =
∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t rather than choosing a single expert. Incentive compatibility is immediate.
The regret bound follows from the fact that, by Jensen’s inequality,
∑
t∈[T ]
`
∑
i∈[K]
pii,tpi,t, rt
 ≤ ∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t`(pi,t, rt).
4 The Partial Information Setting
The encouraging results of the previous section apply only when the learner has access to the reports
of all experts. But what if the learner has only partial information regarding these reports and still
wants to incentivize all experts to report their predictions truthfully? In this section, we provide
and analyze a novel algorithm, Weighted-Score Update with Uniform Exploration (WSU-UX), that
is simultaneously no-regret and incentive-compatible in the bandit setting in which the learner
chooses a single expert It at each round and observes only that expert’s prediction. We show this
algorithm has regret O(T 2/3(K lnK)1/3). This guarantee is weaker than that of EXP3, but we see
in Section 6 that WSU-UX can perform similarly to EXP3 in practice with the additional advantage
of incentive compatibility.
One might think that the standard trick of replacing the loss `i,t with an unbiased estimator ˆ`i,t
in the WSU update rule would suffice in order to guarantee both incentive compatibility and a regret
rate of O(
√
T lnK). Specifically, following Auer et al. [4], we might consider setting ˆ`i,t = 0 for
all experts i 6= It whose predictions we do not observe, and ˆ`It,t = `It,t/piIt,t for the chosen expert.
However, since these estimated losses are unbounded, this could lead to weights pii,t moving outside
of [0, 1], and we would no longer have a valid algorithm.
To solve this, we mix a distribution generated via WSU-style updates with a small amount of
the uniform distribution. This does not affect incentives, since the experts have no way of altering
the uniform distribution, and has the convenient property that the estimated loss function is now
bounded. By carefully tuning parameters, we are able to guarantee a valid probability distribution
over experts. The resulting updates are given in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 WSU-UX with parameters η and γ such that 0 < η, γ < 1/2 and ηK/γ ≤ 1/2.
1: Set pii,1 =
1
K ,∀i ∈ [K]
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3: Choose expert It ∼ pii,t = (1− γ)pii,t + γK
4: Compute: ˆ`It,t =
`It,t
piIt,t
and ˆ`i,t = 0, ∀i 6= It
5: Update pii,t+1=pii,t
(
1−η
(
ˆ`
i,t−
∑
j∈[K] pij,t ˆ`j,t
))
We first prove that this is a valid algorithm, that is, that the distributions p˜it from which an
expert is selected are valid, under appropriate settings of η and γ.
Lemma 4.1. If ηK/γ ≤ 1/2, the WSU-UX weights pit and p˜it are valid probability distributions for
all t ∈ [T + 1].
Proof. We prove this inductively for pit and p˜it simultaneously. The base case is trivial since at
time t = 1, ∀i ∈ [K], pii,1 = pii,1 = 1/K. Now assume that for some t both pit and p˜it are valid
probability distributions. We distinguish two cases. First, suppose i 6= It. Then, since ˆ`i,t = 0, the
WSU-UX update rule becomes
pii,t+1 = pii,t
(
1− η
(
0− piIt,t
`It,t
piIt,t
))
≥ 0.
Second, suppose i = It. Then
pii,t+1 = pii,t
(
1− η
(
`i,t
pii,t
− pii,t `i,t
pii,t
))
= pii,t
(
1− η `i,t
pii,t
(1− pii,t)
)
≥ pii,t
(
1− η
pii,t
)
≥ pii,t
(
1− ηK
γ
)
≥ 0,
where the penultimate inequality comes from the fact that pii,t ≥ γ/K, since by the inductive
assumption pii,t ≥ 0. The last follows from the assumption that ηK/γ ≤ 1/2. Moreover, for the
sum of probabilities we get:
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t+1 =
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t
1− η
ˆ`i,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t

=
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t − η
∑
i[K ]
pii,t ˆ`i,t −
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t

= 1− η
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t ˆ`i,t −
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
 = 1.
Thus pit+1 is valid. Since p˜it+1 is a convex combination of two probability distributions, it is also
a probability distribution, completing the inductive argument.
We are now ready to state the main theorem. The requirement that T ≥ K lnK ensures that
the precondition of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied for the settings of η and γ used.
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Theorem 4.1. For T ≥ K lnK and parameters η =
(
lnK
4K1/2T
)2/3
and γ =
(
K lnK
4T
)1/3
, WSU-UX is
incentive compatible and yields regret R ≤ 2(4T )2/3(K lnK)1/3.
The proof of the theorem will follow from a series of claims and lemmas. We first examine
the moments of ˆ`i,t and verify that it is an unbiased estimator of `i,t; the proof is direct and in
Appendix C.
Lemma 4.2 (Moments). Taking expectation with respect to the choice of expert at round t and
keeping all else fixed, ∀i ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ],EIt∼pit
[
ˆ`
i,t
]
= `i,t. Furthermore,
E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`2
i,t
]
=
`2i,t
pii,t
≤ 1
pii,t
. (3)
We next provide a second-order regret bound. It differs from the standard second-order regret
bounds presented for bandit algorithms (see e.g., Bubeck et al. [5, Chapter 3]) because it relates
the “estimated regret” of the learner to the second moment of the estimated loss of the best-fixed
expert in hindsight. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.3 (Second-Order Bound). For WSU-UX, the probability vectors pi1, . . . ,piT and the esti-
mated losses ˆ`i,t for i ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ] induce the following second-order bound:∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t ˆ`i,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`
i∗,t ≤ lnK
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`2
i∗,t + η
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t ˆ`
2
i,t
where i∗ = arg mini∈[K]
∑
t∈[T ] `i,t.
Proof. Since piT+1 is a valid probability distribution (Lemma 4.1), we have
1 ≥ pii∗,T+1 = pii∗,T
1−η
ˆ`i∗,T−∑
j∈[K]
pij,T ˆ`j,T

= pii∗,1
∏
t∈[T ]
1− η
ˆ`i∗,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t

Taking the logarithm for both sides, and using the fact that pii,1 = 1/K,∀i ∈ [K], we get
0 ≥ − lnK +
∑
t∈[T ]
ln
1− η
ˆ`i∗,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
 . (4)
We next show that for all t ∈ [T ] and any i ∈ [K] η
(
ˆ`
i,t −
∑
j∈[K] pij,t ˆ`j,t
)
≤ 1/2. We distinguish
two cases. First, if i 6= It, then the inequality holds since ˆ`i,t = 0 and as a result the expression
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becomes −η · piIt,t ˆ`It,t ≤ 0. Second, if i = It, then the expression becomes
η
`It,t
piIt,t
− ηpiIt,t
`It,t
piIt,t
= η
`It,t
piIt,t
(1− piIt,t)
≤ η 1
piIt,t
(pii,t ≥ 0, `i,t ≤ 1)
≤ ηK
γ
(pii,t ≥ γ/K, since pii,t ≥ 0)
≤ 1
2
(by definition)
We can now lower bound Equation (4) using the fact that for z ≤ 1/2 it holds that: ln(1 − z) ≥
−z − z2 (Lemma B.2).
0 ≥ − lnK +
∑
t∈[T ]
−η
ˆ`i∗,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
−∑
t∈[T ]
η2
ˆ`i∗,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
2
≥ − lnK − η
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`
i∗,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
− η2
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`i∗,t − ∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
2
≥ − lnK − η
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`
i∗,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
− η2 ∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`2
i∗,t − η2
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
2
≥ − lnK − η
∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`
i∗,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`j,t
− η2 ∑
t∈[T ]
ˆ`2
i∗,t − η2
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t ˆ`
2
j,t
where the second inequality uses the fact that for a, b non-negative, (a − b)2 ≤ a2 + b2 and the
last inequality uses Jensen’s inequality for function f(x) = x2. Rearranging the latter and dividing
both sides by η gives the result.
With that we can complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It follows from incentive compatibility of WSU that an expert maximizes the
expected value of pii,t+1 by minimizing the expected value of ˆ`i,t. From the definition of ˆ`i,t, it is
easy to see that minimizing the expected value of ˆ`i,t is equivalent to minimizing the expected value
of `i,t. By properness of `, this is achieved by truthfully reporting pi,t = bi,t.
We now show the regret bound. Taking expectations with respect to the choice of expert at
round t for both sides of the equation in Lemma 4.3, we get∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`
i,t
]
−
∑
t∈[T ]
E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`
i∗,t
]
≤ η
∑
t∈[T ]
E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`2
i∗,t
]
+
lnK
η
+η
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`2
i,t
]
.
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Using Lemma 4.2, this gives us∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t`i,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
`i∗,t ≤ η
∑
t∈[T ]
1
pii∗,t
+
lnK
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t
1
pii,t
≤ η
∑
t∈[T ]
K
γ
+
lnK
η
+ 2ηKT ≤ ηKT
γ
+
lnK
η
+ 2ηKT,
where the second inequality uses the fact that pii,t ≤ 2pii,t, ∀i ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ] since γ/K ≥ 0 and
γ ≤ 1/2. Next, we re-write pii,t = pii,t−γ/K1−γ , yielding∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t − γK
1− γ `i,t −
∑
t∈[T ]
`i∗,t ≤≤ ηKT
γ
+
lnK
η
+ 2ηKT.
Since 1− γ < 1 and `(pi,t, rt) ≤ 1, this can be relaxed to:∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t` (pi,t, rt)−
∑
t∈[T ]
` (pi∗,t, rt) ≤
≤ γT + ηKT
γ
+
lnK
η
+ 2ηKT.
Making γT = ηKT/γ by setting γ =
√
ηK, and η =
(
lnK
4K1/2T
)2/3
we get the regret result.6
As in the full information setting, a doubling trick can be applied if T is unknown (Ap-
pendix C.2).
We note that, unlike the full information setting in which WSU achieves the optimal regret bound
for general loss functions, our regret bound in Theorem 4.1 is not as good as what can be achieved
without incentive compatibility. Examining our analysis, one can see that if the loss of the best-
fixed expert in hindsight is zero at each round, then the regret guarantee achieved by WSU-UX would
be the same as EXP3, i.e., O(
√
T lnK). Closing this gap via a tighter analysis of WSU-UX or via a
new incentive-compatible algorithm is a compelling question for future work.
5 Forward-Looking Experts
So far we have assumed that the experts are myopic, aiming at time t to optimize their influence
on the algorithm only at time t+ 1 with no regard for future rounds. It is natural to ask whether it
is possible to design learning algorithms that satisfy no regret while incentivizing truthful reports
from forward-looking experts who care about their influence pii,t′ at all t
′ > t. Neither WSU nor
WSU-UX achieve this goal; see the appendix for examples that illustrate why.7
In order to derive an online learning algorithm that is incentive-compatible for forward-looking
experts, we build on work by Witkowski et al. [24], who studied a forecasting competition setting in
which agents make predictions about a series of independent events, competing for a single prize.
6The last derivation requires that η ≤ 1/K, which is true for large enough horizons T ≥ K lnK.
7It is worth noting that in these examples, an expert can gain only a negligible amount from misreporting; it is
an open question whether WSU satisfies some notion of -incentive compatibility.
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Unlike in our setting, their goal was to derive an incentive-compatible mechanism for choosing
the winning agent; they are agnostic to how the elicited forecasts are aggregated. They defined a
mechanism, Event-Lotteries Forecaster Selection Mechanism (ELF), in which, for every predicted
event τ , every agent i is assigned a probability of being the event winner based on the quality of
their prediction. The winner of the competition is the agent who wins the most events.
We build on this idea to define an online learning algorithm, ELF-X, for the full information
setting. Like WSU, ELF-X incorporates WSWM payments, but in a different way. The distribution pit
at time t is defined as the distribution over experts output by the following randomized process:
1. At each round τ ∈ [t], pick agent i as the “winner” xτ with probability
1
K
1− `i,τ + 1
K
∑
j∈[K]
`j,τ
 .
2. Select arg maxi∈[K]
∑
τ∈[t] 1(xτ = i), the expert who won the most events, breaking ties uni-
formly.
It can be shown by a similar argument to that of Witkowski et al. [24] that ELF-X is incentive-
compatible. The proof, along with a formal definition of incentive compatibility for forward-looking
experts, is in the appendix.
Theorem 5.1. ELF-X is incentive-compatible for forward-looking experts.
While proving that ELF-X is no-regret remains an open problem, in the following section, we
present experimental results suggesting that its regret is sublinear in T in practice.
6 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of our proposed incentive-compatible al-
gorithms, WSU and WSU-UX, compared with standard no-regret algorithms. We also evaluate the
performance of ELF-X, which is incentive-compatible for non-myopic experts. Our code and the
datasets we use are publicly available online.8
We ran each algorithm on publicly available datasets from a forecasting competition run by
FiveThirtyEight9 in which users (henceforth called “forecasters”) make predictions about the out-
comes of National Football League (NFL) games. Before each game, FiveThirtyEight releases in-
formation on the past performance of the two opposing teams, and forecasters provide probabilistic
predictions about which team will win the game. FiveThirtyEight maintains a public leaderboard
with the most accurate forecasters, updated after each game. The datasets for the 2018–2019 and
2019–2020 seasons each include all forecasters’ predictions, labeled with the forecaster’s unique id,
information about the corresponding game, and the game’s outcome. Each NFL season has a total
of 267 games, so in our setting, T = 267. For 2018–2019 (respectively, 2019–2020), while 15,702
(15,140) participated, only 302 (375) made predictions for every game. In order to reduce variance,
for each value of K, we sampled 10 groups of K forecasters from the 302 (respectively, 375), and
for each such group, ran each algorithm 50 times.
8Code: https://github.com/charapod/noregr-and-ic. Datasets: https://github.com/
fivethirtyeight/nfl-elo-game
9https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2019-nfl-forecasting-game/
12
Figure 1: Comparisons on the 2018–2019 FiveThirtyEight NFL dataset. Top: Full-information
setting with p¯t the prediction of a single expert chosen according to pit. Middle: Full-information
setting with p¯t =
∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t. Bottom: Partial information setting.
We evaluate performance using quadratic loss. We compare the cumulative loss of each algo-
rithm against the cumulative loss of the best fixed forecaster in hindsight. For the full information
setting, we compare WSU and ELF-X against Hedge, which achieves optimal regret guarantees since
the quadratic loss is exp-concave, and MWU, which is more similar in form to WSU, in order to evaluate
whether anything is lost in terms of regret when incentive compatibility is achieved. For the partial
information setting, we compare WSU-UX against EXP3. For each full information algorithm, we run
both the variant in which a single expert is selected at each timestep and the variant in which the
13
learner outputs a weighted combination of expert reports (labeled *-Aggr). For ELF-X-Aggr, since
pit cannot be computed in closed form, we approximate it via sampling.
We present the results of our experiments on the 2018–2019 dataset in Figure 1; the results
on the 2019–2020 dataset are in Appendix E.1, and exhibit similar trends. We note that lines
correspond to average regret (across all samples of experts and all repetitions), while the error
bands correspond to the 20th and 80th percentiles; this leads to much smaller error bands for
larger values of K since the specific sampling of experts has less influence on regret for large K.
Validating our theoretical results, WSU performs almost identically (in terms of the dependence
on both K and T ) to MWU when fed the same set of reports—this, of course, does not take into
account that MWU is not incentive compatible and may lead to misreports in practice, potentially
degrading predictions. Interestingly, we also see that WSU-Aggr performs almost identically to
MWU-Aggr. This suggests that the performance of WSU-Aggr is considerably better than the bound
in Section 3 implies. It is an interesting open question to see whether better regret guarantees
can be proved for WSU-Aggr, perhaps with respect to the best fixed distribution of experts. As
expected, both WSU and MWU are outperformed by Hedge, which achieves optimal regret bounds for
squared loss but no incentive guarantees.
ELF-X appears to exhibit diminishing regret on this dataset, particularly for K = 5. However,
ELF-X and ELF-X-Aggr perform worse than WSU and WSU-Aggr respectively when fed the same input,
particularly when the number of experts is large. Although ELF-X obtains a stronger incentive
guarantee, the violations of incentive compatibility for forward-looking experts exhibited by WSU
are very small in our examples. In practice, we expect that WSU is a superior choice to ELF-X when
balancing regret and incentive properties, even for forward-looking experts.
For the bandit setting, quite encouragingly, we see that the performance of WSU-UX is only
slightly worse than that of EXP3, and appears significantly better than the O(T 2/3) regret bound in
Section 4 would suggest. This could be a byproduct of our analysis not being tight, and it remains
an open question whether this bound can be improved.
The experiments presented in this section focus on settings with relatively small horizons T
since an NFL season has only 267 matches. In Appendix E.2, we present our results (which also
validate our theoretical analysis) for Monte Carlo simulations for larger horizons.
7 Conclusion and Open Questions
We studied the problem of online learning with strategic experts. We introduced algorithms that are
simultaneously no-regret and incentive-compatible, and assessed their performance experimentally
on data from FiveThirtyEight. Several open questions arise. In the full-information setting, there
is the question of whether an incentive-compatible algorithm exists with better regret bounds for
the special case of exp-concave bounded proper loss functions. For the bandit setting, there is
the question of whether there exist incentive-compatible algorithms that bridge the gap between
the regret of WSU-UX and that of EXP3, and whether a better regret guarantee could be proved for
WSU-UX via a tighter analysis. There is also the question of whether ELF-X is indeed no-regret, as
our experimental results might suggest. More broadly, the most important research question that
we believe needs to be addressed in online learning from strategic agents is the quantification of the
tradeoff between incentive-incompatibility and standard learning guarantees and how to balance
these in practice.
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A Gradient Descent Violates Incentive Compatibility
In gradient descent the loss function that we are trying to optimize is (rt−
∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t)
2. Assume
that for all the experts j 6= i, bj,t = pj,t = 0. Then, from the perspective of expert i and according
to their belief bi,t their expected weight at the next round is
Ert∼Bern(bi,t) [pii,t+1] = bi,t ·
pii,t + 2ηpi,t(1− pii,tpi,t)
1 + 2ηpi,t(1− pii,tpi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1
+ (1− bi,t) ·
pii,t − 2ηp2i,tpii,t
1− 2ηp2i,tpii,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q2
.
We begin with a specific case: K = 10, pii,t = 0.1, bi,t = 0.6. Then, for any η ≥ 2.85 ·10−15 reporting
pi,t = 0.61 is a beneficial manipulation for the expert. To construct similar counterexamples for
any η, one needs to focus on cases where pii,t → 0 (which can be achieved by, for instance, allowing
the number of experts to grow large), hence Q2 is almost 0 and Q1 ends up thus being maximized
when pi,t is maximum (i.e., for pi,t → 1).
B Supplementary Material for Section 3
B.1 Proof of the Validity of WSU
Lemma B.1. The weights pit produced by WSU form a well-defined probability distributions for all
t ∈ [T + 1].
Proof. To show that a distribution is valid, we must show that the components are non-negative
and sum to one. We do this inductively. The base case is satisfied trivially since pii,1 = 1/K for
all i. Now assume that pit is a valid probability distribution. For t+ 1, from Equation 1, we have
pii,t+1 ≥ ηΓWSWMi (pt,pit, rt) ≥ 0 where the last inequality follows from the properties of WSWM and the
assumption that pit is a valid distribution. We also have∑
i∈[K]
pii,t+1 = η
∑
i∈[K]
ΓWSWMi (pt,pit, rt) + (1− η)
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t = η
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t + (1− η)
∑
i∈[K]
pii,t = 1
where the second equality follows from the fact that WSWM is budget balanced and the final equality
from the assumption that pit is a valid distribution.
B.2 Technical Lemma
Lemma B.2. For all x ≤ 1/2, it holds that: ln(1− x) ≥ −x− x2.
Proof. Let function f(x), x ≤ 1/2 be defined as f(x) = ln(1− x) + x+ x2. It suffices to show that
f(x) ≥ 0 for the domain of interest. Taking the first derivative we get
f ′(x) =
−x(2x− 1)
1− x .
For x ≤ 1/2, f ′(x) = 0 for x = 0 and x = 1/2. Now, since f ′(x) ≤ 0, x ≤ 0 and f ′(x) ≥ 0, 0 ≤
x ≤ 1/2 we get that f(x) is decreasing for x ∈ (−∞, 0] and increasing for x ∈ [0, 1/2]. As such,
it presents a minimum at x = 0, and for x ≤ 1/2, f(x) ≥ f(0) = ln(1) + 0 + 0 = 0. Hence,
ln(1− x) ≥ −x− x2.
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B.3 Regret of WSU for Unknown Time Horizon T
In order to provide an anytime variant of WSU, we use a standard doubling trick [4]. We maintain
an estimated upper bound on the time horizon T , denoted n, starting with n = 1. For all rounds
t ∈ (n/2, n], we run WSU using η = ηn =
√
ln(K)/n. If at any round t′ we have that t′ > n,
then we double our estimated horizon upper bound to 2n (changing η accordingly) and restart WSU
by initializing all weights to 1/K. As we prove below, this process increases the regret only by
constants.
Lemma B.3. For an a-priori unknown time horizon T , WSU with a doubling trick is incentive-
compatible and incurs regret R ≤ 2
√
2√
2−1
√
T lnK.
Proof. Using the doubling trick, the time horizon T can be divided into phases during which n,
and hence also η, remain constant. Because of this, from the perspective of an expert i, it does
not matter in which phase the algorithm is currently at: their probability at the next round is
computed as pii,t+1 = ηnΓ
WSWM
i (pt,pit, rt) + (1 − ηn)pii,t, hence it still is a convex combination of a
WSWM payment and pii,t, which cannot be influenced by i’s report at round t. Since the algorithm
every time restarts (i.e., experts’ weights are re-initialized to 1/K) using the new ηn for all the
rounds, this ends up being equivalent to having a constant η throughout T timesteps in terms of
incentives.
Since the length of each phase, n, is doubled at the end of each phase, the number of these phases
is at most dlog T e. Additionally, the actual regret throughout the T rounds is upper-bounded by
the sum of the regret of each phase. Hence, using Theorem 3.1 we have that:
R ≤
blog T c∑
n=0
2
√
2n lnK ≤
(
2
√
lnK
) blog T c∑
n=0
(√
2
)n
=
(
2
√
lnK
) 1−√2blog T c+1
1−√2
=
(
2
√
lnK
) 2 12 blog T c · √2− 1√
2− 1
≤
(
2
√
lnK
) 2blog T 1/2c · √2√
2− 1
=
(
2
√
2
√
lnK
) T 1/2√
2− 1 =
(
2
√
2
√
T lnK
)
√
2− 1
where the first equality comes from the definition of a geometric series with rate
√
2. This concludes
our proof.
C Supplementary Material for Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
For the first moment, we have:
E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`
i,t
]
=
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t
`i,t1{j= i}
pii,t
= `i,t.
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For the second moment, we have:
E
It∼pit
[
ˆ`2
i,t
]
=
∑
j∈[K]
pij,t
`2i,t1{i = j}
pi2i,t
=
`2i,t
pii,t
≤ 1
pii,t
,
where the last inequality uses the fact that `i,t ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ [K], ∀t ∈ [T ].
C.2 Regret of WSU-UX for Unknown Time Horizon T
Similarly to Appendix B.3, in this subsection we use the doubling trick [4] in order to achieve regret
guarantees for WSU-UX for the case of an unknown horizon T . Formally, we prove the following.
Lemma C.1. For an a-priori unknown time horizon T , WSU-UX with a doubling trick is incentive-
compatible and incurs regret R ≤ 8
22/3−1T
2/3(K lnK)1/3.
Proof. Algorithm WSU-UX is divided into phases during which n and η remain constant. This
coupled with the fact that at every phase the algorithm is restarted and the experts’ weights are
re-initialized to 1/K (i.e., hence all previous weights have been updated with the same η) means
that from the perspective of an expect, the incentives structure remains the same. As a result,
WSU-UX with a doubling trick is incentive-compatible.
The number of the algorithm’s phases is at most blog T c. The actual regret throughout the T
rounds is upper bounded by the sum of the regret of each phase. So, from Theorem 4.1 we obtain
that:
R ≤
blog T c∑
n=0
2 · 42/3 · (K lnK)1/3 · (2n)2/3 = 2 · 42/3 · (K lnK)1/3
blog T c∑
n=0
(
22/3
)n
= 2 · 42/3 · (K lnK)1/3 1−
(
22/3
)blog T c+1
1− 22/3 ≤ 2 · 2
2/3 · 42/3 · (K lnK)1/3
(
22/3
)blog T c
22/3 − 1
= 2 · 22/3 · 42/3 · (K lnK)1/3 (2)
2
3
blog T c
22/3 − 1 =
8
22/3 − 1(K lnK)
1/3T 2/3
This concludes our proof.
D Supplementary Material for Section 5
We begin with a definition of incentive compatibility when experts may look more than one timestep
into the future. This stronger version of incentive compatibility requires that for any timestep t
and future timestep tf > t, experts maximize their expected weight at timestep tf by truthfully
reporting their beliefs at all timesteps between t and tf .
Definition D.1 (Incentive Compatibility for Forward-Looking Experts). An online learning algo-
rithm is incentive-compatible for forward-looking experts if for every timestep t ∈ [T ] and every
future timestep tf > t, every expert i with beliefs (bi,t′)t≤t′<tf , and every set of reports of expert i,
(pi,t′)t≤t′<tf , reports of the other experts (p−i,t′)t≤t′<tf , and every history of reports (pt′′)t′′<t and
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outcomes (rt′′)t′′<t,
E
(rt′∼Bern(bi,t′ ))t≤t′<tf
[pii,tf |
(
bi,t′
)
t≤t′<tf ,
(
p−i,t′
)
t≤t′<tf , (pt′′)t′′<t, (rt′′)t′′<t]
≥ E
(rt′∼Bern(bi,t′ ))t≤t′<tf
[pii,tf |
(
pi,t′
)
t≤t′<tf ,
(
p−i,t′
)
t≤t′<tf , (pt′′)t′′<t, (rt′′)t′′<t].
WSU and WSU-UX do not satisfy incentive compatibility for forward-looking experts. We present
an example for WSU, but note that adding a small amount of uniform exploration will still yield a
violation. Observe also that the incentives to deviate in the following example are very small. It is
an open problem whether WSU can sometimes produce larger incentives to misreport, or, conversely,
whether it satisfies some notion of -incentive compatibility.
Theorem D.1. WSU is not incentive-compatible for forward-looking experts.
Proof. Let K = 2, T = 3, and b1,1 = 0.7, b1,2 = 0.6, b2,1 = 0.4, and b2,2 = 0. If both experts report
truthfully at both rounds, it can be checked that the expected weight of expert 1 at timestep 3
is Er1∼Bern(b1,1),r2∼Bern(b1,2)[pi1,3] = 0.5 + 0.1125η − 0.00188325η2. However, if expert one instead
reports p1,1 = 0.699, then his expected weight at timestep 3 is Er1∼Bern(b1,1),r2∼Bern(b1,2)[pi1,3] =
0.5 + 0.112499944η − 0.0018719238η3. It is easy to check that the latter is larger than the former
for all η > 0.0703.
For ease of presentation we do not present a possible manipulation for smaller values of η, but
note that such manipulations can be obtained by considering 0.699 < p1,1 < 0.7.
For completeness, we include here some discussion as to the distinction between our ELF-X
algorithm and the ELF algorithm of Witkowski et al. [24], who designed ELF for selecting the
winner of a forecasting competition.
ELF works similarly to ELF-X as defined in Section 5, except that the “winner” xτ of each round
τ ∈ [t] is chosen with probability 1K
(
1− `i,t′ + 1K−1
∑
j∈[K]\{i} `j,t′
)
.
Unfortunately, direct application of ELF in the online learning settings we are considering in
this paper yields an algorithm with linear regret in the worst case. In particular, when there are
two experts and the reports of each expert are always either 0 or 1, ELF reduces to the Follow-the-
Leader algorithm that, at every timestep, selects the expert with the lowest cumulative loss. It is
well known that Follow-the-Leader has linear regret even under this restriction. ELF-X avoids this
problem by adding additional randomness into the selection of each round’s winner.
We now provide a sketch proof of Theorem 5.1, that ELF-X is incentive-compatible for forward-
looking experts. For details, we refer the reader to Witkowski et al. [24].
Proof Sketch of Theorem 5.1. Incentive compatibility rests on the fact that each expert maximizes
his (subjective) probability of being selected as the event winner of any timestep τ by reporting
pi,τ = bi,τ . This is because an expert’s probability of being selected as the winner of event τ is
exactly their payment from participating in a Weighted Score Wagering Mechanism where every
expert has wager 1/K. Further, it is easy to check that an expert i minimizes the probability of
any other expert j being selected as winner of timestep τ (according to i’s belief bi,τ ).
Fix the winners on all timesteps other than τ . Because the winner at each timestep is chosen
independently of all other timesteps, it is a dominant strategy for each expert to report his belief
bi,τ . Incentive compatibility follows by applying this argument to all timesteps τ .
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Figure 2: Comparisons on the 2019–2020 FiveThirtyEight NFL dataset. Top: Full-information
setting with p¯t the prediction of a single expert chosen according to pit. Middle: Full-information
setting with p¯t =
∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t. Bottom: Partial information setting.
E Supplementary Material for Section 6.
E.1 FiveThirtyEight NFL 2019–2020 Dataset
In this subsection we present in Figure 2 the results of our experiments for the 2019–2020 FiveThir-
tyEight NFL dataset. The findings and conclusions are almost identical to those drawn using the
2018–2019 FiveThirtyEight NFL dataset found in Section 6.
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E.2 Monte Carlo Simulations with Large Horizon T
In this subsection, we present our results for Monte Carlo simulations for larger horizons in Figure 3.
We simulated the following setup: K = 50, T = 2500 and we repeated the simulations for 50
repetitions. The lines correspond to average regret (across all repetitions), and the error bands in
Figure 3 correspond to the 20th and the 80th percentiles.
The realized outcomes are sampled as follows: for rounds 0 ≤ t ≤ T/2, rt ∼ Bern(0.4), and
for rounds T/2 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T , rt ∼ Bern(0.6). The K experts are randomly partitioned into three
equal-sized groups sampling their beliefs from three different distributions: for experts in the first
group we draw bi,t ∼ Unif[0, 0.7] for all rounds t, for the second group bi,t ∼ Unif[0.3, 1] for all
t, and for the third group bi,t ∼ Unif[0, 1] for all t. As a result, in expectation, experts from the
first group perform best for the first T/2 rounds, the second group performs best for the next T/2
rounds, while the third group performs best when all T rounds are considered.
Figure 3: Simulation Results for K = 50 experts. Left: Full-information setting with p¯t the
prediction of a single expert chosen according to pit. Middle: Full-information setting with p¯t =∑
i∈[K] pii,tpi,t. Right: Partial information setting.
Due to the way we constructed the simulation parameters, examining the performance of the
algorithms for timesteps between [0, T/2] provides intuition about their performance for settings
where the experts’ performance is relatively stable over time. However, their performance for
timesteps between [T/2, T ] provides intuition for settings where the best expert is shifting over
time. As a result, for timesteps between [0, T/2] our findings are similar to the findings of our
experiments on the FiveThirtyEight NFL datasets: ELF performs worse than WSU (which performs
identically to MWU) and worse than Hedge, and WSU-UX performs almost identically to EXP3 despite
our weaker theoretical bound.
Interestingly, for timesteps between [T/2, T ] we find that ELF briefly performs better than
WSU, MWU and Hedge. We conjecture that this is due to the fact that ELF in the first T/2 timesteps
takes longer than MWU, WSU and Hedge to converge to experts in the first group. Because these
experts are no longer optimal throughout the T timesteps, ELF has an advantage over the other
algorithms.
Lastly, we note that the regret performance of the aggregating variants of all algorithms is
always negative due to the fact that the expectation over all experts is very close to issuing the
optimal prediction for all rounds. As a result, a prediction that takes into account all of their
predictions in a weighted fashion performs much better than the prediction of any fixed expert in
hindsight. We also note that the fact that Hedge is performing worse than the other algorithms is
not contradicting the theoretical results, which are only stated in terms of worst case upper bounds.
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Finally, we see that ELF-X-Aggr performs better than all algorithms in this setting. Explaining
this phenomenon theoretically even for particular settings is a question of great interest.
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